

## CHAPTER 5      OFFICIAL      DEVELOPMENT      ASSISTANCE      AND DEVELOPMENT FINANCE IN SADC

### *Introduction*

- 5.01 Private investment flows to SADC have yet to materialise in the amounts which the sub-region needs for future investment and growth. But SADC has been a major recipient of *official development assistance* (ODA) from the rest of the world for some time. One-third of such assistance has been *development finance* through multilateral development banks (MDBs) both global (WB Group) and regional (AfDB). A small part of the flows from MDBs have been on-lent through national DFIs to finance SADC's infrastructure and industry (the focus of this study). But most of the funds from the MDBs have been deployed for adjustment lending, social lending and other purposes.
- 5.02 Between 1985-95 - when South Africa was ineligible for ODA because of sanctions - SADC obtained nearly US\$ 45 billion in assistance from abroad. Of this amount over US\$25 billion was provided bilaterally (i.e. by other governments). A further US\$11 billion came from MDB's, primarily the World Bank (US\$ 7.5 billion) and the AfDB (US\$3.3 billion). About US\$6 billion originated from other multilateral sources (e.g. the EU, IFAD and UN agencies). SADC countries borrowed US\$2.8 billion (gross) from the IMF for stabilisation and adjustment during this period, half of that by Zambia. In nominal dollars, net ODA disbursements to SADC increased from around US\$2 billion annually in 1985 to over \$6 billion annually in 1995, but fell to \$4.6 billion in 1997. It is clear from the pattern between 1992-97 that ODA flows will probably continue to decline as the millennium approaches and beyond.

**Table 5.A Official flows (commitments) to SADC By Country (1985-95)**  
(Billions of US Dollars)

Country	Bilateral Flows		MDB Flows		IMF	
	Amt(\$ bn)	%	Amt(\$bn)	%	Amt(\$bn)	%
Angola	1.27	5.0	0.59	5.5	0.00	0.0
Botswana	0.66	2.6	0.28	2.6	0.00	0.0
Lesotho	0.49	1.9	0.30	2.8	0.04	1.5
Malawi	1.81	7.2	1.41	13.0	0.22	7.8
Mauritius	0.20	0.8	0.36	3.4	0.22	7.8
Mozambique	5.42	21.6	1.92	17.7	0.20	7.1
Namibia	0.60	2.4	0.03	0.3	0.00	0.0
South Africa	0.82	3.3	0.00	0.0	0.61	21.7
Swaziland	0.25	1.0	0.20	1.9	0.00	0.0
Tanzania	6.40	25.4	2.36	21.8	0.22	7.8
Zambia	4.21	16.6	1.91	17.6	1.05	37.0
Zimbabwe	3.06	12.2	1.37	12.6	0.44	15.6
<b>Total SADC</b>	<b>25.25</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>10.78</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>2.80</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Source : OECD

- 5.03 Though denied access to ODA until 1992, South Africa created its own powerful internal development financing machinery for large industrial and infrastructure projects between 1985-94. It relied on equity capital funded entirely by government and leveraged with foreign and domestic market borrowings. ODA flows to SADC averaged US\$48 per capita annually over the 1985-95 period and accounted for over 10% of the region's GDP excluding South Africa. But the results of this large transfer of external resources - by way of output growth, investment and development - have not been impressive. The outcome of large aid flows and increasing aid dependence raise serious questions about the efficacy and value of ODA and development finance flows to SADC over the last decade. They also raise questions about the effectiveness of policy and administrative regimes prevailing when ODA was provided; remembering, of course, that this was a period when SADC was enmired in sub-regional conflict and destabilisation.
- 5.04 The failure of ODA to improve investment and growth performance in SADC raises doubts about how productive further inputs of development finance (whether supported by ODA or not) are likely to be in the future. Significant changes have occurred in the political economy and policy environment of SADC that augur well for the future. But the same changes have not yet occurred in SADC's public administration or institutional capacity. In the view of many investors that capacity has deteriorated. Questions also have to be raised about the effectiveness of further ODA and development finance flows to SADC in the absence of rapid progress with structural change despite some progress with policy reform. In particular, given the evident failure of their parastatals, the productive sectors of SADC economies have not been privatised rapidly enough in comparison with other developing regions. Consequently, SADC has not been able to attract sufficient investment particularly in infrastructure-related services, especially in energy, telecommunications and transport operation services.
- 5.05 The politics of SADC explain a part of the failure of ODA and development finance to achieve worthwhile results. But there are two other reasons why large inputs of ODA may have failed. The *first*, lies in its uneven distribution across countries, sectors and in its deployment. As shown in Table 5.A, *country-wise*, 84% of the total (bilateral + multilateral) ODA flowing to SADC between 1985-95 went to five countries: Malawi (9.0%); Mozambique (20.5%); Tanzania (24.6%); Zambia (17.1%) and Zimbabwe (12.4%). Although aid propped up investment and growth in Mozambique and Tanzania between 1990-95, that was not the case for Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe, which have continued to decline economically throughout this decade. These countries are arguably still among the weakest economies of the sub-region. Zimbabwe was one of the powerhouses of SADC but it now has a political and policy environment that is inimical to private investment and to realising its potential.
- 5.06 The *second* reason for aid failure in SADC is that large inflows of ODA have been offset by large outflows of debt service payments, primarily to official creditors. Indeed a large part of the ODA flows to the sub-region would not have occurred, especially between 1989-1993, had bilateral and multilateral creditors not found it necessary to extend extraordinary levels of assistance to heavily indebted countries. A significant proportion of these flows was earmarked for meeting debt service obligations to preferred multilateral creditors.
- 5.07 Between 1985-95, total external debt service payments made by SADC countries amounted to around US\$50 billion. That amount was US\$5 billion more than the total amount of ODA it received. But that bald comparison is misleading. Of the total debt service paid by SADC to external creditors, over US\$28.5 billion (or 57%) was paid by South Africa, a country which received a negligible amount (under US\$1 billion) of ODA over that period. The rest of SADC, which received over US\$44 billion of ODA, paid out nearly US\$21.5 billion in total debt service, thus benefiting from a net inward flow of external resources of US\$22.5 billion

over that period. This amounts to an average of just over US\$2 billion annually. This net amount is about half the amount of ODA received and explains, in part, why ODA provided to SADC did not achieve as much as might have been expected over the decade. Table 5.B elaborate on the debt service picture.

**Table 5.B External Debt Service Payments made by SADC Countries (1975-95)**  
(US Dollars)

Country	Total Debt Service 85-95		Annual Average Debt Service		
	Amt(\$bn)	%	75-84(\$mn)	85-89(\$mn)	90-95(\$mn)
Angola	2.7	5.4	0.0	172.5	294.0
Botswana	0.9	1.7	13.0	63.7	94.7
Lesotho	0.3	0.6	6.0	19.1	31.1
Malawi	1.1	2.2	57.0	110.4	97.7
Mauritius	1.7	3.5	54.0	147.8	166.7
Mozambique	1.0	2.0	0.0	69.4	111.7
Namibia	0.0	0.1	n.a	1.2	4.2
South Africa	28.6	57.2	n.a	2,391.8	2,796.8
Swaziland	0.4	0.7	12.0	36.9	29.1
Tanzania	2.0	3.9	100.1	150.2	205.3
Zambia	5.6	11.2	296.0	219.4	752.3
Zimbabwe	5.7	11.5	107.3	467.0	568.3
<b>Total SADC</b>	<b>50.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>n.a</b>	<b>3,813.1</b>	<b>5,159.1</b>
<b>SADC - SA:</b>	<b>21.5</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>n.a</b>	<b>1,457.3</b>	<b>2,362.4</b>

Source : OECD

- 5.08 *Sectorally*, about 32% of the total ODA which went to SADC between 1985-95 was absorbed by food aid, emergency relief, humanitarian assistance, policy reform and debt relief (see Table 5.C below). Only about 11% of such flows were invested in human capital (education and health) while 26% were absorbed by infrastructure with a disproportionately large part (two-thirds) being spent on maintenance and rehabilitation of existing infrastructure rather than on new investment. Of ODA expenditures on infrastructure, less than 3% was spent on telecommunications. About 4% was spent on water supply and sanitation, 7% on the rehabilitation of electricity supply, while 11% was dedicated to the restoration of disrupted transport links to help land-locked SADC countries reduce their dependency on road/rail links to South African ports. Investment in SADC's industry (both directly and through DFIs) accounted for nearly 6% of total ODA allocations. The tourism and trade sectors absorbed a further 6%, with agriculture accounting for 11%. A large part of the bilateral aid flows classified under specific sectors include expenditures on technical assistance rather than on hard investments. Altogether, therefore less than 30% of total ODA flowing to SADC between 1985-95 was invested in productive investment and much of that proved to be inefficient.

#### ***Flows of External Development Finance to SADC***

- 5.09 Flows of external *public and development finance* to SADC for infrastructure, industry (including mining and manufacturing) and for other commercial activities (such as trade and tourism) came from three main sources: (i) bilateral sources, i.e. governments and their aid and investment agencies; (ii) the World Bank; and (iii) the AfDB. The relative distribution of their flows is indicated in Table 5.C. Whereas 34% of all bilateral ODA was channelled towards these activities, the proportions were 40% and 60% respectively in the case of the World Bank and AfDB.

5.10 Between 1985-95 nearly a third of World Bank lending to SADC was for policy reform through structural or sectoral adjustment loans. The proportions of bilateral and AfDB assistance for that kind of lending were 11.4% and 7.7% respectively. Almost all ODA provided by all sources to SADC countries during this period was conditional on policy reforms. Those conditions applied as much to project and sector loans as to programme (budget and import support), multi-sector and policy support loans.

**Table 5.C Official flows (commitments) to SADC By Sector and Use (1985-95)**  
(Millions of US Dollars)

Sector	Bilateral Flows		Multilateral Development Bank Flows			
	Amt(\$m)	%	World Bank		African Dev. Bank	
			Amt(\$m)	%	Amt(\$m)	%
<b>Human Capital:</b>	<b>2,399.7</b>	<b>9.6</b>	<b>930.9</b>	<b>12.4</b>	<b>441.7</b>	<b>13.4</b>
Education	1,389.9	5.6	387.8	5.2	329.6	10.0
Health	1,009.8	4.0	543.1	7.2	112.1	3.4
<b>Agriculture</b>	<b>2,310.4</b>	<b>9.2</b>	<b>1,107.0</b>	<b>14.7</b>	<b>630.2</b>	<b>19.2</b>
<b>Programme Aid:</b>	<b>8,153.5</b>	<b>32.6</b>	<b>2,458.6</b>	<b>32.8</b>	<b>253.4</b>	<b>7.7</b>
Food Aid	2,530.2	10.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Emergency	116.5	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Debt Relief	2,657.4	10.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Policy Reform	2,849.4	11.4	2,458.6	32.8	253.4	7.7
<b>Infrastructure:</b>	<b>5,425.3</b>	<b>21.4</b>	<b>2,367.5</b>	<b>31.6</b>	<b>1,558.1</b>	<b>47.4</b>
Water Supply	1,209.9	4.8	109.0	1.5	196.9	6.0
Power/Energy	1,515.3	6.1	661.3	8.8	415.2	12.6
Trnspt/T`com	2,700.1	10.8	1,238.5	16.5	946.0	28.8
Urban Dvlpmt.	0.0	0.0	358.7	4.8	0.0	0.0
<b>Commercial:</b>	<b>3,101.2</b>	<b>12.4</b>	<b>627.9</b>	<b>8.4</b>	<b>401.3</b>	<b>12.2</b>
Industry/Mining	1,054.0	4.2	627.9	8.4	248.3	7.6
DFI's	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	153.0	4.6
Trade/Tourism	2,047.2	8.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
<b>TA + Other</b>	<b>2,011.6</b>	<b>8.1</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>
<b>Total SADC</b>	<b>25,013.4</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>7,491.9</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>3,284.7</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Source : OECD

5.11 As Table 5.C shows, lending to and through DFIs by bilateral sources and the World Bank virtually ceased by 1985. These sources provided intermediary financing through more broadly designed financial sector loans rather than through DFI lending. The World Bank had, before 1985, been instrumental in establishing many (if not most) of the DFIs in SADC countries where it was operating at the time. It had supported them with loans/credits as well as equity investments by IFC, its private sector affiliate. However, DFI lending went out of vogue in the World Bank Group in the aftermath of the debt crisis. Lending for financial sector reform became ascendant instead. The AfDB, however, has continued to support DFIs after 1985 although only 4.6% of its lending to SADC countries between 1985-95 comprised such loans and credits. These amounted in total to US\$153 million and represented loans to DFIs in Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe or to development finance windows in commercial banks as in the case of Mozambique.

- 5.12 Conceivably, lending by the MDBs (as well as by bilateral export credit and investment agencies) to SADC countries between 1985-95 might have been larger had some SADC countries (e.g. Zambia) retained their earlier creditworthiness. That would also have been true if Angola, Namibia and South Africa had been eligible to borrow - which they were not for a variety of well-known reasons. In 1985, only three SADC countries (Mauritius, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe) were eligible to borrow from the 'hard windows' of the World Bank and AfDB. In 1995 that number had expanded to six with Botswana, Namibia and South Africa being added to that list.
- 5.13 Due to SADC's limited creditworthiness, most bilateral ODA flows were provided on grant or concessional (i.e. with a grant element of 80% or more) terms. For the same reason, nearly 80% of lending by the multilateral development banks was on soft terms (i.e. through IDA and AfDF credits instead of IBRD and AfDB loans). Thus SADC was less a recipient of international development financing as such. It was instead a recipient of public finance (because that is what donor contributions from their budgets to IDA and AfDF represent) intermediated through global and regional MDBs.

### *The Economic Impact of ODA on SADC Countries*

- 5.14 A cursory analysis of the data available shows no correlation between net flows of ODA to SADC countries between 1978-97 and their growth or investment performance. Countries receiving the largest ODA flows relative to the size of their economies, especially between 1990-95, did not perform better than other SADC countries, despite aid relieving severe investment and consumption constraints in these countries (Table 5.D). Instead the two countries with the lowest relative aid flows in the 1990s, Botswana and Mauritius, were also the best performers. But that observation is inherently circular; the low proportion of aid they received reflected the fact that they did not need it.

**Table 5.D ODA Receipts & Comparative Economic Performance in SADC (1975-95)**

Country	Total ODA/GDP %			Investment (GDI)/GDP%			Real GDP Growth %		
	75-84	85-89	90-95	75-84	85-89	90-95	75-84	85-89	90-95
<b>High ODA</b>									
Lesotho	24.6	29.9	19.2	35.1	49.9	82.3	4.7	7.0	5.0
Malawi	11.1	21.4	28.8	25.3	17.3	16.6	3.2	1.4	3.0
Mozambique	10.0	42.6	84.8	17.5	30.6	49.5	n.a	6.0	5.5
Tanzania	10.1	19.4	27.3	22.6	23.9	32.8	3.0	4.0	3.4
Zambia	6.3	16.5	27.8	22.3	14.7	12.8	0.2	2.1	0.0
<b>Medium ODA</b>									
Angola	n.a	1.8	6.0	n.a	16.3	14.0	n.a	4.7	-2.9
Namibia	n.a	1.2	5.8	23.2	14.1	21.7	n.a	2.8	4.3
Swaziland	7.7	6.2	5.7	31.5	21.6	18.8	3.5	5.8	2.1
Zimbabwe	2.0	8.6	20.2	21.7	21.5	2.9	3.9	1.0	
<b>Low ODA</b>									
Botswana	11.7	7.8	3.2	36.0	23.8	33.1	11.3	10.5	4.8
Mauritius	3.6	3.0	1.5	25.3	26.6	29.0	3.7	7.7	5.2
South Africa	0.0	0.0	0.1	27.1	19.4	16.4	2.6	1.6	0.8

5.15 There does appear to be a correlation between increases in ODA and decreases in domestic savings in particular countries. Data suggest that in five SADC countries (Malawi, Namibia, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe) ODA may have substituted for domestic savings (especially public savings). But it did so without creating conditions in which domestic savings could be increased so that investment and development became self-sustaining over the foreseeable future. Some of these countries may well have become addicted to foreign aid with no clear 'exit strategy' in sight for reducing aid dependence in a manner which would avoid severe transitional trauma. The incidence of ODA flows and changes in patterns of domestic savings in SADC over the same period is shown in Table 5.E. More detailed breakdowns of ODA flows to SADC are provided in Tables 5.F to 5.K which follow.

**Table 5.E ODA Receipts & Savings Performance in SADC (1975-95)**

Country	Total ODA/GDP %			Savings (GDS)/GDP %		
	75-84	85-89	90-95	75-84	85-89	90-95
<b>High ODA</b>						
Lesotho	24.6	29.9	19.2	-73.6	-67.2	-26.7
Malawi	11.1	21.4	28.8	15.6	10.0	4.0
Mozambique	10.0	42.6	84.8	-6.6	-1.2	9.6
Tanzania	10.1	19.4	27.3	14.3	6.5	4.1
Zambia	6.3	16.5	27.8	18.9	14.9	9.9
<b>Medium ODA</b>						
Angola	n.a	1.8	6.0	n.a	25.9	30.4
Namibia	n.a	1.2	5.8	13.7	16.4	13.5
Swaziland	7.7	6.2	5.7	16.5	20.4	10.7
Zimbabwe	2.0	8.6		23.1	24.7	18.2
<b>Low ODA</b>						
Botswana	11.7	7.8	3.2	20.9	42.0	31.5
Mauritius	3.6	3.0	1.5	21.5	25.5	23.9
South Africa	0.0	0.0	0.1	30.3	26.8	17.1

### Conclusion

5.16 Flows of official development assistance and development finance (from global and regional DFIs) have been substantial but have been a mixed blessing in SADC. Apart from earlier assistance to Botswana, there is no clear cut case for believing that such flows have been beneficial to SADC in terms of investment, growth and development. Much of the aid provided to the sub-region between 1985-95 was diverted to help SADC countries cope with the consequences of conflict and destabilisation rather than to address the problems of development. But even the relatively small proportion of aid that was meant to foster development did not quite have the impact that was expected of it.

5.17 The impact of aid flows and externally provided development finance have been vitiated to a large extent by:

- *The country distribution of aid flows:* External aid was concentrated in the region's weakest economies and for that reason did not yield a large a pay-off.
- *The sectoral distribution and use of aid:* Relatively little aid was focused on investment in SADC. Most aid was aimed at other uses.
- *The external debt service burdens of SADC countries:* More than half of the aid flows to SADC countries other than South Africa were recycled as debt service payments to official creditors - in fact debt service payments to the multilaterals over this period by SADC

countries other than South Africa exceeded the total disbursements received from them. In the case of South Africa, there was a total gross transfer on the debt service account of nearly US\$30 billion between 1985-95.

5.18 Since 1992 much has changed in SADC to improve the chances that future flows of aid and development finance might yield a higher pay-off. But there is no cause for being sanguine just because SADC's political fortunes have changed for the better with its former anti-development regimes having been relegated to history. The region has made a belated return to an era that is freer of internecine conflict. Yet there is concern about:

- the weakness of *governance* and the state apparatus in most SADC countries;
- the spread of *corruption* across SADC;
- the *slow rate of privatisation* that signals continued reluctance on the part of SADC governments and vested political interests to eliminate state control over productive activity; and
- the relative *uncompetitiveness* of SADC as an investment location to global investors faced with other choices.

5.19 Despite the progress it has undoubtedly made in the last half decade, SADC - for all these reasons -- remains an unattractive participant in a rapidly globalising economy in which lower-cost competitors such as India and China have a larger competitive advantage in manufacturing. In the absence of progress on these four fronts, there is little prospect that a change in political fortunes alone will result either in increasing the level, or improving the productivity, of domestic or foreign investment in SADC. Under such circumstances, infusions of development finance can only play a rearguard role that might ultimately prove counterproductive if they result in entrenching and delaying structural change rather than in encouraging and accelerating it.

**Table 5.F Bilateral ODA Flows to SADC – Commitments, 1985-95** (Millions of US Dollars)

<i>Country</i>	<i>1985</i>	<i>1986</i>	<i>1987</i>	<i>1988</i>	<i>1989</i>	<i>1990</i>	<i>1991</i>	<i>1992</i>	<i>1993</i>	<i>1994</i>	<i>1995</i>	<i>TOTAL</i>
Angola	66.7	68.0	83.1	97.1	24.6	156.9	221.9	199.4	47.6	46.1	257.0	<b>1268.4</b>
Botswana	59.0	74.2	42.7	114.5	1.4	70.8	47.0	81.4	65.0	31.9	72.9	<b>660.8</b>
Lesotho	47.4	51.2	44.3	51.7	12.4	43.1	63.5	63.1	37.1	36.7	42.9	<b>493.4</b>
Malawi	59.6	171.9	116.9	220.8	27.4	218.0	158.9	230.6	124.8	282.5	203.7	<b>1815.1</b>
Mauritius	-	-	-	-	-	-	52.8	23.9	23.8	71.2	31.7	<b>203.4</b>
Mozambique	232.7	373.0	486.1	777.5	90.0	488.7	621.5	905.4	534.5	379.7	531.8	<b>5420.9</b>
Namibia	0.7	0.1	0.0	2.8	1.1	38.3	157.7	90.5	120.3	122.7	70.3	<b>604.5</b>
South Africa	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.8	108.9	126.8	271.5	315.3	<b>824.3</b>
Swaziland	22.1	24.7	15.1	16.1	1.4	15.2	28.4	29.5	28.6	25.4	47.2	<b>253.7</b>
Tanzania	300.4	603.9	922.9	625.9	131.1	617.8	840.0	786.9	808.6	362.8	425.1	<b>6425.4</b>
Zambia	187.2	252.0	327.8	255.8	19.3	427.4	650.6	738.4	494.3	437.4	420.9	<b>4211.1</b>
Zimbabwe	150.7	209.1	235.6	340.0	10.2	185.9	403.3	490.7	372.4	256.8	415.2	<b>3069.9</b>
<b>TOTAL SADC</b>	<b>1126.5</b>	<b>1828.1</b>	<b>2274.5</b>	<b>2502.2</b>	<b>318.9</b>	<b>2262.1</b>	<b>3247.4</b>	<b>3748.7</b>	<b>2783.8</b>	<b>2324.7</b>	<b>2834.0</b>	<b>25250.9</b>

**Table 5.G Bilateral ODA Flows to SADC – Disbursements, 1985-95** (Millions of US Dollars)

<i>Country</i>	<i>1985</i>	<i>1986</i>	<i>1987</i>	<i>1988</i>	<i>1989</i>	<i>1990</i>	<i>1991</i>	<i>1992</i>	<i>1993</i>	<i>1994</i>	<i>1995</i>	<i>TOTAL</i>
Angola	63.0	95.0	100.0	109.0	113.0	167.0	161.0	196.0	159.0	226.0	248.0	<b>1637.0</b>
Botswana	64.0	81.0	124.0	127.0	120.0	119.0	106.0	100.0	80.0	58.0	54.0	<b>1033.0</b>
Lesotho	58.0	56.0	63.0	70.0	74.0	85.0	74.0	69.0	78.0	46.0	62.0	<b>735.0</b>
Malawi	54.0	85.0	170.0	181.0	182.0	316.0	209.0	208.0	159.0	251.0	221.0	<b>2036.0</b>
Mauritius	22.0	50.0	53.0	48.0	51.0	77.0	60.0	34.0	27.0	7.0	8.0	<b>437.0</b>
Mozambique	228.0	326.0	538.0	735.0	582.0	752.0	774.0	1013.0	819.0	735.0	704.0	<b>7206.0</b>
Namibia	4.0	7.0	16.0	17.0	36.0	39.0	95.0	98.0	123.0	113.0	144.0	<b>692.0</b>
South Africa	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	183.0	214.0	318.0	<b>715.0</b>
Swaziland	19.0	25.0	30.0	23.0	12.0	36.0	31.0	27.0	33.0	28.0	38.0	<b>302.0</b>
Tanzania	388.0	519.0	719.0	786.0	693.0	847.0	761.0	813.0	649.0	576.0	591.0	<b>7342.0</b>
Zambia	212.0	349.0	346.0	407.0	314.0	409.0	583.0	699.0	511.0	434.0	439.0	<b>4703.0</b>
Zimbabwe	218.0	189.0	265.0	230.0	226.0	305.0	358.0	535.0	307.0	279.0	344.0	<b>3256.0</b>
<b>TOTAL SADC</b>	<b>1330.0</b>	<b>1782.0</b>	<b>2424.0</b>	<b>2733.0</b>	<b>2403.0</b>	<b>3152.0</b>	<b>3212.0</b>	<b>3792.0</b>	<b>3128.0</b>	<b>2967.0</b>	<b>3171.0</b>	<b>30094.0</b>

Sources : OECD and World Bank



**Table 5.H World Bank Group Flows (IBRD + IDA) to SADC – Commitments, 1985-95 (Millions of US Dollars)**

<i>Country</i>	<i>1985</i>	<i>1986</i>	<i>1987</i>	<i>1988</i>	<i>1989</i>	<i>1990</i>	<i>1991</i>	<i>1992</i>	<i>1993</i>	<i>1994</i>	<i>1995</i>	<i>TOTAL</i>
Angola	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	60.7	168.1	19.9	0.0	24.0	<b>272.7</b>
Botswana	36.7	7.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	<b>44.3</b>
Lesotho	3.5	9.8	0.0	36.4	12.1	21.0	25.2	9.8	0.0	11.0	0.0	<b>128.8</b>
Malawi	79.6	36.7	43.9	101.7	133.6	77.2	101.5	204.9	70.8	71.5	95.4	<b>1016.8</b>
Mauritius	0.0	30.0	25.0	10.0	30.0	12.4	15.6	15.0	20.0	7.7	46.5	<b>212.2</b>
Mozambique	45.0	0.0	90.0	75.9	282.1	69.1	0.0	353.4	58.8	427.0	98.7	<b>1500.0</b>
Namibia	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	<b>0.0</b>
South Africa	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	<b>0.0</b>
Swaziland	8.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	29.0	0.0	<b>37.6</b>
Tanzania	8.0	140.0	23.0	203.3	66.3	519.4	342.5	59.6	333.9	182.7	7.5	<b>1886.2</b>
Zambia	68.1	101.4	10.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	278.2	305.9	136.5	266.5	331.1	<b>1497.7</b>
Zimbabwe	10.0	10.0	0.0	76.7	116.3	53.1	25.0	325.0	189.5	90.0	0.0	<b>895.6</b>
<b>TOTAL SADC</b>	<b>259.5</b>	<b>335.5</b>	<b>191.9</b>	<b>504.0</b>	<b>640.4</b>	<b>752.2</b>	<b>848.7</b>	<b>1441.7</b>	<b>829.4</b>	<b>1085.4</b>	<b>603.2</b>	<b>7491.9</b>

**Table 5.I AfDB/Fund Flows (AfDB + AfDF + NTF) to SADC - Loan Commitments, 1985-95 (Millions of US Dollars)**

<i>Country</i>	<i>1985</i>	<i>1986</i>	<i>1987</i>	<i>1988</i>	<i>1989</i>	<i>1990</i>	<i>1991</i>	<i>1992</i>	<i>1993</i>	<i>1994</i>	<i>1995</i>	<i>TOTAL</i>
Angola	1.0	53.5	0.0	0.0	4.7	114.1	94.4	56.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	<b>324.2</b>
Botswana	17.6	0.0	87.7	25.3	39.1	25.6	41.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	<b>237.0</b>
Lesotho	17.1	12.6	16.6	23.1	3.4	20.2	1.1	85.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	<b>179.5</b>
Malawi	16.2	20.7	12.4	14.8	19.1	73.4	81.3	80.3	80.3	0.0	0.0	<b>398.5</b>
Mauritius	0.0	0.0	51.8	6.7	0.0	0.0	37.2	21.1	0.0	36.7	0.0	<b>153.5</b>
Mozambique	0.0	3.7	0.0	115.5	12.1	19.5	29.0	150.9	90.1	0.0	0.0	<b>420.8</b>
Namibia	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	18.9	12.7	0.0	0.0	<b>31.6</b>
South Africa	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	<b>0.0</b>
Swaziland	5.5	11.4	8.6	0.0	11.8	1.7	9.3	70.8	14.2	36.1	0.0	<b>169.4</b>
Tanzania	0.6	1.0	125.5	17.1	18.2	91.2	57.3	125.0	38.1	4.5	0.0	<b>478.5</b>
Zambia	59.1	56.0	22.2	33.2	38.4	98.2	58.7	35.9	1.8	0.0	10.8	<b>414.3</b>
Zimbabwe	54.9	10.9	48.5	17.9	2.9	34.4	187.0	1.4	116.9	0.0	2.6	<b>477.4</b>
<b>TOTAL SADC</b>	<b>172.0</b>	<b>169.8</b>	<b>373.3</b>	<b>253.6</b>	<b>149.7</b>	<b>478.3</b>	<b>597.0</b>	<b>646.2</b>	<b>354.1</b>	<b>77.3</b>	<b>13.4</b>	<b>3284.7</b>

Source : World Bank and African Development Bank

**Table 5.J Total MDB Commitments to SADC, 1985-95 (Millions of US Dollars)**

<i>Country</i>	<i>1985</i>	<i>1986</i>	<i>1987</i>	<i>1988</i>	<i>1989</i>	<i>1990</i>	<i>1991</i>	<i>1992</i>	<i>1993</i>	<i>1994</i>	<i>1995</i>	<i>TOTAL</i>
Angola	1.0	53.5	0.0	0.0	4.7	114.1	155.1	224.6	19.9	0.0	24.0	<b>596.9</b>
Botswana	54.3	7.6	87.7	25.3	39.1	25.6	41.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	<b>281.3</b>
Lesotho	20.6	22.4	16.6	59.5	15.5	41.2	26.3	95.2	0.0	11.0	0.0	<b>308.3</b>
Malawi	95.8	57.4	56.3	116.5	152.7	150.6	182.8	285.2	151.1	71.5	95.4	<b>1415.3</b>
Mauritius	0.0	30.0	76.8	16.7	30.0	12.4	52.8	36.1	20.0	44.4	46.5	<b>365.7</b>
Mozambique	45.0	3.7	90.0	191.4	294.2	88.6	29.0	504.3	148.9	427.0	98.7	<b>1920.8</b>
Namibia	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	18.9	12.7	0.0	0.0	<b>31.6</b>
South Africa	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	<b>0.0</b>
Swaziland	14.1	11.4	8.6	0.0	11.8	1.7	9.3	70.8	14.2	65.1	0.0	<b>207.0</b>
Tanzania	8.6	141.0	148.5	220.4	84.5	610.6	399.8	184.6	372.0	187.2	7.5	<b>2364.7</b>
Zambia	127.2	157.4	32.2	33.2	38.4	98.2	336.9	341.8	138.3	266.5	341.9	<b>1912.0</b>
Zimbabwe	64.9	20.9	48.5	94.6	119.2	87.5	212.0	326.4	306.4	90.0	2.5	<b>1372.9</b>
<b>TOTAL SADC</b>	<b>431.5</b>	<b>505.3</b>	<b>565.2</b>	<b>757.6</b>	<b>790.1</b>	<b>1230.5</b>	<b>1445.7</b>	<b>2087.9</b>	<b>1183.5</b>	<b>1162.7</b>	<b>616.5</b>	<b>10776.5</b>

**Table 5.K Total MDB Disbursements to SADC, 1985-95 (Millions of US Dollars)**

<i>Country</i>	<i>1985</i>	<i>1986</i>	<i>1987</i>	<i>1988</i>	<i>1989</i>	<i>1990</i>	<i>1991</i>	<i>1992</i>	<i>1993</i>	<i>1994</i>	<i>1995</i>	<i>TOTAL</i>
Angola	-	37.0	36.0	50.0	58.0	103.0	119.0	156.0	139.0	227.0	177.0	<b>1102.0</b>
Botswana	-	22.0	32.0	25.0	42.0	29.0	30.0	23.0	47.0	29.0	37.0	<b>316.0</b>
Lesotho	-	31.0	44.0	42.0	64.0	58.0	53.0	74.0	68.0	71.0	53.0	<b>558.0</b>
Malawi	-	110.0	106.0	194.0	252.0	289.0	316.0	365.0	339.0	218.0	213.0	<b>2402.0</b>
Mauritius	-	5.0	10.0	9.0	10.0	13.0	8.0	11.0	-1.0	7.0	14.0	<b>86.0</b>
Mozambique	-	95.0	129.0	183.0	238.0	256.0	301.0	459.0	367.0	496.0	400.0	<b>2924.0</b>
Namibia	-	9.0	1.0	5.0	23.0	84.0	89.0	46.0	32.0	25.0	43.0	<b>357.0</b>
South Africa	-	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	92.0	80.0	68.0	<b>240.0</b>
Swaziland	-	9.0	15.0	14.0	17.0	19.0	23.0	27.0	20.0	29.0	18.0	<b>191.0</b>
Tanzania	-	147.0	180.0	230.0	225.0	327.0	319.0	530.0	304.0	392.0	291.0	<b>2945.0</b>
Zambia	-	105.0	80.0	71.0	60.0	72.0	301.0	337.0	361.0	285.0	1596.0	<b>3268.0</b>
Zimbabwe	-	36.0	28.0	43.0	39.0	36.0	35.0	259.0	191.0	282.0	145.0	<b>1094.0</b>
<b>TOTAL SADC</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>606.0</b>	<b>661.0</b>	<b>866.0</b>	<b>1028.0</b>	<b>1286.0</b>	<b>1594.0</b>	<b>2287.0</b>	<b>1959.0</b>	<b>2141.0</b>	<b>3055.0</b>	<b>15483.0</b>

Source : OECD